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TOWARD A "NEW DEAL" FOR COPYRIGHT
IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Pamela Samuelson*·
By Jessica L itman. Amherst, New York:
Prometheus Books. 2001. Pp. 208. Cloth, $25.

DIGITAL COPYRIGHT.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Jessica Litman1 believes the public needs a very good copyright
lawyer, and if I have not mistaken her intentions, she is volunteering
for the job (pp. 70-73). A century of Congressional deference to
industry-negotiated compromises has produced, she argues, a copy
right law that is both incomprehensible and unfair.2 This incompre
hensibility might be tolerable if copyright law governed only commer
cial relations among industry participants, all of whom have copyright
counsel. To the extent that copyright law applies to the conduct of or
dinary persons,3 its incomprehensibility presents serious difficulties.4
Moreover, to the extent that copyright law makes illegal many ordi
nary activities of individuals5 - for example, making private copies of
music for oneself or to share with a friend or forwarding articles to
friends via the Internet - it has become unfair as well (pp. 19, 28). As
the public's copyright lawyer, Jessica Litman advises us not to accept
the current deal (p. 20). In Digital Copyright, she outlines a framework
for a copyright law that would be a new and better deal for the public
and would be short, comprehensible, and normative in character
(pp. 180-84).
While Litman does not advocate lawlessness until the new deal has
been adopted, she makes clear that she does not object to widespread
noncompliance with copyright law in the meantime. In fact, the pub* Chancellor's Professor of Law and Information Management, University of California
at Berkeley. B.A. 1971, University of Hawaii; J.D. 1976, Yale. - Ed.
1. Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.

2. Litman has harsh words for current copyright law, which she characterizes as "com
plex, internally inconsistent, wordy, and arcane," as well as unfair. P. 19.
3. See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of
copyright to ordinary people.
4. Litman discusses these difficulties in chapters 4, 8, and 12.
5. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text for more details as to Litman's argu
ment.
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lic's noncompliance with strict copyright rules fuels Litman's hopes for
eventual change (p. 194). People do not obey laws they don't believe
in, she argues, and governments find it difficult to enforce laws that
lack public support (p. 112). Therefore, if something has to change,
Litman believes it will be copyright law, not the behavior of the public.
Digital Copyright is Litman's paean to a future in which copyright will
once again be a component of the nation's enlightened information
policy.
As will become evident (if it isn't already), Litman's perspective on
copyright law and my own are quite similar. Yet Litman's work is dis
tinctive in several respects: in her informed historical perspective on
copyright law and its legislative policy; her remarkable ability to
translate complicated copyright concepts and their implications into
plain English; her willingness to study, understand, and take seriously
what ordinary people think copyright law means; and her creativity in
formulating alternatives to the present copyright quagmire.6 Perhaps it
is too much to ask that D igital Copyright also provide concrete strate
gies for transforming the copyright legislative process so that the ,new
deal of copyright would become feasible. It is difficult, however, to
come away from this book without wishing Litman had the ingenuity
to be the public's chief strategist for achieving the new deal as well.
II.

COPYRIGHT POLICY AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROC ESS

Much of Litman's career has been devoted to studying and writing
about the legislative process for making copyright policy.7 She is one
of the few living .persons familiar with the entire legislative history some twenty years' worth of materials - of the Copyright Act of 1976.
One might initially have thought that the past hundred years of copy6. This is not to say that Litman is the only creative copyright scholar of the day. In fact,
the field of copyright scholarship is alive with talent, much of which focuses on digital copy
right issues. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 122-41
(2000); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The Poli
tics ofIntellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997); Julie E.
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97
MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the
Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Opera
tors, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlap
ping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Demo.cratic
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). I confess to contributing to this discussion as well,
although often in venues outside of the law review literature. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights and the Global Information Economy, 39 COMM. ACM 23 (Jan.
1996); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED 134 (Jan. 1996).

7. See, e.g. , Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
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right lawmaking would be a very abstruse subject with little or no
relevance to current digital copyright debates. In Digital Copyright,
Litman shows that this history has considerable significance and, in
fact, is at the heart of the problem.
A key legislative development of the past century is the evolution
of a pattern of congressional activity on making copyright law and
policy. About one hundred years ago, says Litman,
Congress got into the habit of revising copyright law by encouraging rep
resentatives of the industries affected by copyright to hash out among
themselves what changes needed to be made and then present Congress
with the text of appropriate legislation. By the 1920's, the process was
sufficiently entrenched that whenever a member of Congress came up
with a legislative proposal without going through the cumbersome pre
legislative process .of multiparty negotiations, the affected industries
united to block the bill. (p. 20)

Litman observes that this process "generates legislation with some
predictable features" (pp. 23-24). For one thing, established industry
players will not support any bill that would leave them worse off than
under current law. Second, these players will frequently characterize
the state of current law as though it already favors their position, the
current law being the baseline against which negotiations will occur.
Third, negotiations tend to result in very specific and detailed rules
that resolve the main concerns of the players at that stage of the indus
try's history. The first two of these features tend to tilt copyright law in
the direction of ever stronger protection, while the third contributes to
the law's incomprehensibility. In addition, "[t]his type of drafting pro
cess makes it exceedingly difficult to speak of legislative intent if by
legislative intent one means the substantive intent of members of
Congress" or to discern "any overall purpose pervading the text of the
statute" (p. 53).
Delegation of legislative drafting to affected industry groups has
some undeniable benefits. Copyright industry representatives obvi
ously have a much better understanding of the likely impacts of par
ticular rules for their industry than do members of Congress (p. 61).
Insofar as the affected industry groups are able to reach consensus on
legislation, Congress can have confidence that this will produce work
able results. Congress may also assume that the resulting legislation
must adequately balance the interests of the affected parties; other
wise the compromise would not have been achieved.8 Delegation of
authority to the industry thus not only takes advantage of industry ex
pertise, but it also makes lawmaking on copyright issues politically
feasible (p. 73).
8. Litman says that "while it is easy to claim that the interplay among all of the interests
affected by copyright provides a proxy for the public interest, the statute that this interplay
produces demonstrates that this isn't so." P. 73.
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This pattern of industry-negotiated and industry-drafted legislation
also has negative consequences. Among the most serious is that
emerging industries - along with those that have yet to be invented
- do not have a seat at the negotiating table, and hence their interests
will generally not be taken into account in the process of crafting revi
sions to the law (p. 62). Moreover, to the extent that established indus
try players perceive emerging industries as threats to their hegemony,
they will be inclined to craft legislation granting them advantages over
these rivals (pp. 144-45).
Litman gives both past and contemporary examples of this phe
nomenon. In the early days of the sound recording and motion picture
industries, for example, these nascent industries did not have a seat at
the negotiating table, and they consequently had no influence over
rules adopted without attention to their interests or in order to disad
vantage them (p. 39). Now that these industries have become estab
lished players, they exercise their considerable clout in the legislative
process to disadvantage upstart Internet-savvy rivals, as evidenced in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").9
Litman explains that disadvantaging upstart rivals is much easier
now than it was thirty years ago because of a major restructuring of
U.S. copyright law in 1976. The Copyright Act of 1909 and its prede
cessor statutes ·granted different sets of exclusive rights to different
kinds of works.10 The narrow crafting of the 1909 Act's exclusive rights
provisions often meant that a new technology or industry escaped li
ability because Congress had not anticipated it.11 The law was
amended numerous times to take new technologies or industries into
account, sometimes the goal being to provide the new industry with
copyright protection12 and sometimes to extend the rights of an exist
ing industry so that the emergent industry had to pay for its use of
copyrighted materials.° The Copyright Act of 1976 adopted a far sim
pler structure in which virtually all works were accorded the same set
of five exclusive rights,14 which were qualified by a series of very spe9. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), the relevant provisions of which are now
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-04. The DMCA is discussed at length in Digital Copyright, par
ticularly in chapter 9.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1976).
11. See, e.g. , White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that
piano roll recordings did not infringe copyright in musical compositions).
·

12. See, e.g. , CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW§ 1.04, at 11 (2d ed. 1991) (noting
that motion pictures were added to the subject matter of copyright in 1912).
13. See pp. 39-40 (explaining that copyright law was amended to give owners of copy
rights in musical compositions the right to control mechanical reproductions of their works
in sound recordings).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Some works (e.g., sound recordings) enjoy some but not all
of these exclusive rights. See id. §§ 106(4), 106(5). Some works (e.g., sound recordings) have
special exclusive rights privileges. See id. §§ 106(6), 106A.
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cific exceptions.15 Libraries, veterans' groups, and nonprofit horticul
tural organizations were among the groups that managed to persuade
Congress to exempt some of their activities from copyright law.16
Litman argues that the 1976 Act dramatically changed copyright
law's baseline presumption from one in which upstarts often found
shelter because existing rights were narrowly crafted to one in which
upstarts were likely to run afoul of a broad exclusive right. In the post1976 era, upstarts rarely qualify for an existing exception because the
need for such an exception was not recognized in 1976 (p. 37). This
pattern of broad rights and narrow limitations is replicated in the new
DMCA rules outlawing acts of circumvention of technical measures
used by copyright owners to protect access to their works and outlaw
ing circumvention technologies.17
As serious as may be the exclusion of emerging industries from the
copyright lawmaking process and the impact of the restructured copy
right law for emerging industries, this is not Litman's main concern in
Digital Copyright. Rather, her primary concern is with the impact of
the current law on the activities of ordinary people, particularly as re
gards use of digital information on the Internet. The public has also
been excluded from the copyright legislative process. To the extent
that copyright law applies to private activities of members of the pub
lic, this exclusion is unacceptable (p. 116). The broad rights/narrow ex
ceptions structure of the 1976 Act arguably disadvantages members of
the public just as it does emerging industries. Moreover, the copyright
industry's sense of ownership of the copyright policy process - and
Congress's acquiescence in this, owing at least in part to their being
the source of generous campaign contributions - has erected a seri
ous obstacle to reforming the current legislative process.18
15. 17 u.s.c. §§ 107-22 (2000).
16. See id. §§ 108 (granting exception for library and archival uses of copyrighted
works), 110(6), 110(10) (exempting some performances of some copyrighted works in the
course of functions sponsored by nonprofit horticultural organizations or veterans groups).
Only the fair use provision has sufficient generality that emerging or future industries can
invoke it as a shelter for their activities. See id. § 107; see also infra note 66 for examples of
the successful assertion of fair use as a shelter for new technologies.
17. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(l)(A), (a)(2), (b)(l) (2000) (granting broad rights);
1201(c)-G) (containing narrow exceptions).
18. Litman mentions the influence of copyright industry campaign contributions. P. 62.
Litman gives this example of the copyright industry's sense of entitlement to control the
copyright policy agenda:
Allen Adler, the chief lobbyist for the book publishers group, was frankly resentful that the
Commerce Committee had dared to insist on exercising jurisdiction in the first place [during
the legislative process leading up to enactment of the DMCA). He found it outrageous that
Commerce Committee members, who had far less experience on copyright bills than their
colleagues on the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, would insist that the content
community make a deal that would satisfy libraries, universities, or consumer electronics
manufacturers . . . . [C]ontent lobbyists made the rounds, characterizing library, university,
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The public can be forgiven for thinking that copyright law simply
doesn't apply to their ordinary activities. After all, most of the exclu
sive rights of the 1976 Act specifically regulate public acts - the right
to control distribution of copies to the public and public performances
and displays - not private ones.19 Private noncommercial copying of
copyrighted materials has generally been deemed fair use following
the Supreme Court's Sony Betamax ruling under which private non
commercial copying is presumed to be fair.20 Insofar as the public un
derstands copyright law, the principal norm they grasp is that it is for
bidden . .to commercialize someone's work, but not to make private,
noncommercial uses of it. If the public's conception of copyright law
aligns with what the law actually provides, there should be no prob
lem.
So, either something has dramatically changed to put the public so
much at risk or Litman has gone off the deep end. Litman argues that
the digitalization of information and the rise of global networks such
as the Internet have presented an occasion for a transformed concep
tion of copyright law's scope (pp. 14, 25-26). Notwithstanding the Sony
Betamax decision, copyright industries regard private copying of copy
righted materials as infringements,21 especially when the works are
available in digital form, because of the new licensing models under
development to charge for such uses.22 If private copying threatens
copyright industry markets, the fair use defense arguably crumbles.23
Moreover, in an act of "breathtaking hubris" (p. 30), copyright in
dustry supporters have embraced the view that copyright owners are
entitled to control all access to and uses of copyrighted works in digital
form because each act involves reproductions of the. work in the ranand consumer electronics proposals as scandalous, unprecedented, and unabashedly greedy.
P. 140.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)-(5) (2000). Litman briefly mentions these limitations. P. 71.
20. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). The Court
went on to say that this presumption should only be overcome if there was proof of a mean
ingful likelihood of harm to copyright markets. Id. I will refer to this case in the text as Sony
Betamax.

21. See, e.g.,

COMPUTER

S CI. &

TELECOMMS.

BD.,

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE

AGE 129-39 (2000)
(discussing private copying); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting

DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION

(hereinafter

DIGITAL DILEMMA]

Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace,

95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Report of W9rking Group on Intellectual Property Rights of Information
Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property Rjghts and the National Information Infra
structure 82 (Sept. 1995) (hereinafter White Paper] (arguing that there is less need for fair
use because of the emergence of new licensing models for digital information).
23. The fair use provision directs courts to consider harm not only to actual markets but
also to potential markets for the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Am. Geo
physical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing emergence of licensing
system for photocopying weighed against fair use defense).
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dom access memory of a computer.24 They also believe that digitaliza
tion puts an end to copyright's "first sale" doctrine, which has allowed
sharing of one's CD with a friend or reselling a book after finishing it,
since to redistribute a digital copy of a work requires making a copy in
the transmission process.25 Copyright industries are experimenting
with technical measures to prevent unauthorized private copying of
copyrighted materials,26 and they convinced Congress to pass the
DMCA, which grants them rights to control circumvention of these
technical measures and the making and distribution of technologies
capable of circumvention.27
This lays the groundwork for the "pay-per-use" economy in digital
information that some copyright industries seem to desire (p. 27). Use
of technical measures makes the public's access to ideas and informa
tion "contingent on the copyright holders' marketing plans, and puts
the ability of consumers to engage in legal uses of the material in those
texts within the copyright holder's unconstrained discretion. In es
sence, that 's an exclusive right to use" (p. 83). Litman's principal ob
jection is that this transformation of copyright was accomplished by a
"sleight of hand," not an informed debate on the merits with an op
portunity for meaningful public input (p. 86). To the extent that copy
right has been so transformed, Litman would agree with the copyright
industries that the public does not comply with the law. Her preferred
solution, however, is not beefed-up enforcement or copyright re
education camp for the public,28 but rather a good copyright lawyer to
represent the public's interests. Much of D igital Copyright is given
over to explaining what the public's copyright lawyer ought to do to
turn things around.29
·

24.

DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note

21, at 140-44; White Paper, supra note 22, at 65-66.

25. White Paper, supra note 22, at 90-95 (arguing that the first sale rule does not apply
to sharing of digital information). The first sale right limits the distribution right, not the re
production right, so insofar as sharing a digital copy involves reproduction, that copying is
not covered by the first sale privilege of 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000). Litman expresses dismay
about the loss of first sale rights. Pp. 81-82.
26. See, e.g., Digital Dilemma, supra note 21, at 153-71.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). Litman recounts the history of the enactment of the DMCA
in chapter 9 of Digital Copyright.
28. Litman observes that the public has been resistant to copyright education efforts.
P. 114.
29. Being the public's copyright lawyer is, in Litman's view, the job of Congress. P. 74.
Litman believes, however, that "Congress lacks the interest, expertise, and institutional
memory to represent the public on this partictJlar project, and has found significant political
benefits in deferring to the interests the legislation affects." P. 74. Congress also has its own
copyright lawyer to draw upon, namely, the Register of Copyrights whose Office is part of
the Library of Congress.
Unfortunately the Copyright Office has tended to view copyright owners as its real constitu
ency and has spent the past ten years moving firmly into the content industry's pocket. The
reasons are unexceptional: The office has a limited budget, and relies on the goodwill of its
regular clients. Copyright Office policy staff often come from and return to law firms that
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Ill. CAN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE COPYRIGHT LEGISLATIVE AND
POLICY PROCESS BE REPAIRED?

The breakdown of the copyright legislative policy process leads
Litman to imagine a role for the public's copyright lawyer in
construct[ing] a copyright law that affords members of the public the op
portunity to read, see, hear, and otherwise experience, download, buy,
borrow, and keep copies of all or at least most of the works that are out
there, while according ample compensation to the authors and publishers
of copyrighted works, and encouraging them to produce and disseminate
as many copyrighted works as they are able to. (pp. 72-73)

The revised law should, she thinks, "be about three pages long, should
strike more folks than not as more fair than not, and should be suffi
ciently intuitive to appeal to schoolchildren" (p. 73). Litman then sets
forth the principal norms that she thinks should be embodied in a re
vised copyright law for an information age.
Litman recommends jettisoning the reproduction right of current
copyright law because digital information cannot be used without
making copies, and hence, the reproduction right is no longer a useful
mechanism by which to distinguish activities that copyright owners
should be able to control and those that they should not.30 Instead, she
suggests that copyright owners should have an exclusive right to con
trol commercial exploitations of their works as well as a right to con
trol large-scale interferences with such commercial operations:31 She
regularly represent copyright owners. Perhaps most importantly, the Copyright Office relies
on the copyright bar to protect it from budget cuts and incursions on its turf.
P. 74.
Litman might have invoked public choice theory to explain why Congress and other
government entities have been so receptive to copyright industry concerns, but this is not her
wont.
30. P. 180. A recent report of the National Research Council makes a similar observa
tion about the reproduction right. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 21, at 140-45. It is
worth noting that copyright law protects more than digital works, and as to other works, the
reproduction right may continue to be useful. Litman does not discuss whether repeal of the
reproduction right or adoption of a narrower set of exclusive rights is consistent with treaty
obligations the United States has under the Berne Convention and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See Berne Convention for the Pro
tection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971; see
also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia
tions, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS - THE LEGAL TEXTS 2-3 (Gatt Secretariat ed.,
1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF URUGUAY ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the

World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex JC: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, reprinted in RESULTS OF URUGUAY ROUND, supra, at 6-19,

365-403.

31. Pp. 180-81. This might mean, for example, that Napster would be liable for its inter
ference with the recording industry's commercialization of sound recordings, although indi
vidual user sharing of music would not give rise to liability. P. 181. But see infra note 35 and
accompanying text (suggesting that Napster should not have been liable for copyright in
fringement).
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trusts courts to engage in common law decisionmaking to apply these
rules in light of a revised law's normative purposes.32 Litman proposes
a statutory affirmation of the public's rights in copyright, including
rights to access, read, view, and listen to publicly available works; to
cite, extract, and re-use facts and ideas they contain; and, if necessary,
to circumvent technical protections to access facts and ideas.33 Litman
would return copyright law to the era in which this law was conceived
as a bargain under which copyright owners get assurance they will be
compensated for making their works available in exchange for which
the public would get access to and the ability to make reasonable uses
of the works.34
Although articulating a framework for a new deal for copyright is
an important step toward achieving the goal, . Litman proffers few
ideas about how the copyright policy process itself might be reformed.
At one point, she posits the existence of a hypothetical benevolent
despot and explains how the despot might configure copyright law if
its goal was to promote the development of new technologies
(pp. 172-73). Such a despot would permit the emergence of innovative,
Internet-based technologies, such as Napster and MP3.com, for dis
seminating music free fr om copyright controls.35 Litman points to sev
eral historical examples to illustrate the soundness of such a decision,
explaining that some major copyright industries - including the sound
recording, cable television, and videocassette industries - began in
the shelter of copyright limitations.36 Of course, Litman does not really
32. P. 181. Litman believes that the highly specific exceptions in the current copyright
law could then be repealed as unnecessary.. P. 182. While I find those exceptions as unread
able as Litman does, I do not object to their continued presence in the copyright statute be
cause they are workable accommodations for the affected industries and do not impact the
public.
33. Pp. 175-84. Litman would not allow the public's rights to be overridden by contrac
tual provisions or technical measures aiming to undermine them. Pp. 175-84. Oddly enough,
Litman does not suggest a reaffirmation of the fair use principle, even though it often limits
the scope of copyright as to clearly commercial activities. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that 2Live Crew's commercial sound recording of a
"Pretty Woman" rap parody qualified for fair use). Litman also does not mention the dura
tion of copyright she thinks is appropriate.
34. Chapter 5 discusses changing concepts of copyright. Years ago, copyright was
thought to provide a limited monopoly to authors as a quid pro quo for benefits to society.
P. 78. A more recent conception is that copyright is a property right that gives authors and
publishers the right to control all uses of their works. P. 81.
35. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (service that
allowed users to share copies of MP3 files via the Internet was liable for indirect copyright
infringement); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(making copies of sound recordings for service enabling users to listen to previously pur
chased music held to be copyright infringement).
36. P. 173. The Supreme Court twice ruled that cable television retransmission of broad
cast signals did not infringe the public performance right of copyright law, even though it
was clearly a commercial operation. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415
U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Tele., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). Eventually,
the public performance right was extended to encompass cable retransmission of broadcast
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advocate the appointment of a benevolent despot. The suggestiOn is
just a device for leaping over the broken policy process and offering
an alternative copyright policy for. discussion.
Apart from this, Litman says only that "consumers' widespread
noncompliance (with strict copyright norms] offers a very real ray of
hope."37 If " [p]eople don't obey laws they don't believe in" (p. 195)
and if " [g]overnments find it difficult to enforce laws that only a hand
ful of people obey" (p. 195), then she believes that copyright law will
eventually have to change or become irrelevant.38 For her a lesson of
the Napster controversy is that " [i]f 137 million members of the gen
eral public copy, save, transmit, and distribute content witho�t paying
attention to the written copyright rules, those rules are in danger of
becoming irrelevant" (p. 114). Yet copyright would seem very relevant
if the recording industry can get injunctions not only against Napster,
but against other peer-to-peer technology providers, such as Aimster
and Grokster.39
It is understandable that Litman has so little confidence in
Congress as an instrument of change toward a more enlightened copy
right policy. After all, she knows better than anyone else the history of
copyright industry domination of the legislative process. Moreover,
her participation in the legislative struggles over the DMCA left her
even more disillusioned than her academic study of the subject. The
DMCA, she· asserts, "is substantially more pernicious than the bill
originally proposed by the . . . White Paper" (p. 145). The White Paper
bill was ''breathtakingly expansive but it was short. It didn't improve
the copyright law's general level of incomprehensibility but it didn't
exacerbate it either" (p. 145). The DMCA, by contrast, is "riddled
with ambiguities, internal inconsistencies, contradictions, and obfusca-

programming under one of the negotiated provisions that Litman criticizes. See 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 111 (2000) (the former defining "public performance" as including transmissions, and
the latter allowing cable systems' secondary transmission of broadcast programs).
37. P. 194. Litman adds:
If someone claims that a law provides such and such, but such and such seems to make no
sense, then perhaps that isn't really the law, or wasn't intended to be the way the law
worked, or was the law at one time but not today, or is one of those laws, like sodomy law,
that it is OK .to ignore. Our current copyright statute has more than merely a provision or
two that doesn't make a lot of sense; it's chock full of them.
P. 114.
38. Pp. 111-14. Litman makes a passing reference to "copyright police," p. 194, but she
does not seem to think it likely that serious attempts will be made to enforce copyright laws
against individual users.
39. See A&M Records, 239 F.3d 1004 (holding injunction overbroad but remanding for
narrower drafting. See, e.g., Brad King, Aimster the Latest to Chime In, WIRED, Nov. 14,
2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,48255,00.html (discussing litigation
between the recording industry and Aimster); Complaint in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Inc., available at http://Www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v _Grokster/20011002mgm_v_grokster_
complaint.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
·
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tory prose" (p. 142). There is, Litman intimates, no Mr. Smith in Con
gress whose goal is to bring about a more balanced copyright policy.
While I am no admirer of the DMCA, I see in it more of an at
tempt at balanced copyright law than she does. For one thing, the
DMCA soundly rejected the copyright industry's position that Inter
net service providers ("ISPs") should be strictly liable for copyright
infringement of users.40 Instead, Congress enacted a broad set of safe
harbor provisions pertaining to the transmission, storage, and caching
of copyrighted information, as well as protecting information location
tools, such as search engines, against unwarranted claims of infringe
ment.41 This was a victory not only for ISPs and Internet firms, but also
for members of the public.42
Second, an important backdrop to the DMCA legislative debate
was a digital copyright treaty negotiated in Geneva in December 1996.
This treaty repudiated numerous highly protectionist provisions ini
tially supported by the Clinton Administration and adopted instead a
balanced set of copyright rules.43 Congressional ratification of this bal
anced treaty was in the public interest and is very much part of the
current digital copyright policy landscape. Litman only briefly men
tions the treaty and its far more balanced copyright rules (pp. 128-29).
Third, while I agree that the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions
are in some respects worse than the White Paper's proposal,44 they are
·

40. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 22, at 114-24 (asserting online service providers
were strictly liable for copyright infringements of their users).
41. 17 u.s.c. § 512 (2000).
42. Not only did the safe harbors ensure that ISPs and Internet search engines could
continue to provide useful services to Internet users free from copyright owner controls, but
the DMCA also protected user privacy by providing that ISPs had no duty to monitor users
and set up stiff notice and counternotice requirements so that users would be protected
against vague or false claims of copyright infringement. See id. § 512(c)(3), (f), (g).
43. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/89 (Dec. 20, 1996). A very similar treaty was concluded on the same date con
cerning intellectual property protection for sound recordings. See WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/90
(Dec. 20, 1996); see also Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty,
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96. See
generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369
(1997) (analyzing provisions in the draft treaty and the treaty finally adopted). U.S. officials
initially supported provisions that would have given copyright owners the right to control
temporary as well as permanent copies of works, that threatened fair use and other limita
tions and exceptions to copyright law, and that would have adopted a White Paper-like anti
circumvention rule. The final treaty only required signatories to provide some protection
against circumvention of technical measures, omitted the proposed provision on temporary
copies, and included an agreed upon statement of interpretation of the treaty endorsing the
continued viability of exceptions and limitations in copyright and foreseeing that new exceptions might be needed for the digital environment.
·

44. The White Paper did not recommend outlawing the act of circumventing technical
measures. See White Paper, supra note 22, Appendix 1, at 6. The DMCA, however, makes
circumventing access controls illegal. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A) (2000).
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better in other ways.45 There may be more wiggle-room in the DMCA
rules and more ambiguity in the legislative history than Litman per
ceives.46 Fourth, Congress has taken some heed of public interest con
cerns as to legislation aimed at giving copyright-like protection to fac
tual compilations, despite strong support for the legislation from
major publishers.47
While copyright industry groups will certainly continue to have in
fluence in the copyright policy process, a great many organizations
represent interests that overlap with those of the public at large, and
some of them - universities and other educational institutions, con
sumer protection groups, scientific and technical organizations, com
puter industry groups, and consumer electronics manufacturers may become more effective lobbyists on copyright matters in future
years. Congress might also establish something akin to the Office of
Technology Assessment to provide it with independent advice about
policy options when legislating on intellectual property and other is
sues responding to challenges presented by new technologies.48 In
Congressman Rick Boucher, the public has a would-be Mr. Smith who

45. The White Paper legislation would have outlawed technologies if the primary pur
pose or effect was to circumvent technical measures._ White Paper, supra note 22, Appendix
1, at 6. The DMCA makes illegal technologies that are primarily designed or produced to
circumvent technical measures. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l) (2000). The White Paper leg
islation contained no exceptions or limitations on its scope. White Paper, supra note 22, Ap
pendix 1, at 6. Although the DMCA has too few exceptions and limitations, at least it recog
nizes the legitimacy of many acts of circumvention and of making tools for circumvention.
See id. § 120l(d)-(j); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why
the Anti-circumvention Rules Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 543-46
(1999) (explaining why the DMCA needs more exceptions and limitations than it currently
has). The DMCA anti-circumvention provision requires the Librarian of Congress to hold
periodic hearings to determine if additional exceptions are needed and empowers the Li
brarian to issue rules to provide further exceptions. Id. § 1201(a)(l)(B)-(C). The first set of
hearings and rulemaking proceeding added two new exceptions to the anti-circumvention
rules. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556-01 (Oct. 28, 2001) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 2d).
46. Courts could look to several provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) to limit the applica
tion of the DMCA rules. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 45, at 537-43 (discussing 1201(c)
and other exceptions); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing
Works: The Development of an Access Right in .U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY (Hugh Hansen ed., forthcoming June 2002) (suggesting that
1201(c) may permit some fair use circumventions).
47. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Re
cent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

793 (1999) (discussing two such bills H.R. 2281 and H.R. 354).

48. The Office of Technology Assessment wrote a number of reports on intellectual
property issues. See., e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, FINDING
A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1992); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES THE LAW
(1989); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (1986).
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is committed to legislation restoring balance in copyright law that was
lost by enactment of the DMCA.49 If the public once again becomes
engaged in copyright . policy issues, this · may attract supporters to
Boucher's bills.
Public involvement in the· copyright policy process is not without
precedent. In the 1980s, while the Sony Betama:x case was pending be
fore the Supreme Court, consumer groups actively lobbied for legisla
tion to protect personal use copying and against copyright industry
supported legislation that would have outlawed it.50 Similar lobbying
in the 1990's led to enactment of a little-noticed exemption for non
commercial copying of sound recordings that Congress hoped would
finally resolve the controversy about private copying of music.51 If the
sound recording industry does not make digital music broadly avail
able on reasonable terms, it is quite possible that legislation will be
needed to promote broader public access to and ability to use re
corded music. Senator Orrin Hatch has made clear that he will be
watching developments in this area.52 Also, copyright industry groups
may become overconfident and go too far in pressing their legislative
agenda. The Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") has
recently urged enactment of legislation to mandate installation of
technical measures into all interactive digital devices.53 This may trig
ger a counter-reaction by affected industry groups and the general
public, although this obviously remains to be seen.
Executive Branch developments could also help to change the
policy environment. If, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice

49. See, e.g., Representative Rick Boucher (D-VA), Address at American University,
Washington College of Law (Mar. 6, 2001), available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/
intelpro/20010306boucher.asp (concerning proposals for changes to the fair use doctrine in
the context of digital and Internet media). Boucher sponsored an alternative bill to the
DMCA to provide for a minimalist implementation of the digital copyright treaties. See
Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1998).
50. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE AND THE
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR (1987).
51. Audio Home Recording Act, Pub. L. No. 102"563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (now codi
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10). The exemption for noncommercial copying of analog and some
digital sound recordings is codified Id. § 1008. Congress also passed the Fairness in Music
Licensing Act that expanded an existing exception allowing commercial establishments to
play music without paying royalties to copyright owners in the music. See Pub. L. No. 105298 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)).
52. Senator Hatch has expressed concern about this and held hearings on digital music
services. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearings on "Music on the Internet: Is
There an Upside to Downloading?," available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/
wl7112000.htm. Senator Hatch's statement at that hearing on July 11, 2000, can be found at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciaryn11200_ogh.htm.
53. See Declan McCulloch, New Copyright Bill Heading to DC, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 7,
2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46655,00.html (discussing the
Security Systems Standards and Certification Act ("SSSCA") that would mandate installa
tion of standard technical protection measures in all interactive digital devices).
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determined that the member firms of the Recording Industry Associa
tion of America ("RIAA'') or MPAA were engaging in anti
competitive conduct in the development or distribution of new digital
entertainment products and instituted lawsuits challenging this con
duct as a violation of the antitrust laws, the industry's control over the
policy process would be lessened,s4 A similar result would flow from a
possible Federal Trade Commission charge that some of these firms
were engaging in unfair trade practices.ss Even in the absence of such
developments, it is surely true that the entertainment industry does
not enjoy the same level of support from the B ush administration as it
had from the Clinton administration. There is, moreover, reason to
think that some Bush administration officials - notably John
Ashcroft - may support more balanced copyright policies.s6
Courts may also have a role to play in protecting the public interest
in digital copyright law. This can happen in several ways. Courts may
decide that existing law. does not reach as far as copyright owners as
sert; that some new limiting principles are needed for copyright law to
achieve its purposes; or that constitutional limitations preclude con
struing the law to reach certain conduct. Sony Betamax is the best
known example of the first category,57 but several digital copyright de
cisions may be cited as well, including Galoob v. Nintendo,s8 Lotus v.
Borland,s9 and RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia.60 Computer Associates
v. Altai,61 Sega v. A ccolade,62 and Religious Technology Center v. Net-

54. See Laura M. Holson & Rick Lyman, U.S. Inquiry is Raising Speculation in Holly
wood, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at Cl (reporting on investigation into possible anti

competitive conduct by motion picture studios as to online.rnovie services).

55. The European Union has been investigating whether the country-coding of DVD
movies is a device to overprice DVDs. See, e.g., European Union Probes DVD Pricing, SAN
JOSE MERC. NEWS, June 12, 2001, at 3G.
56. When Ashcroft was Attorney General for the state of Missouri, he filed an arnicus
brief in support of Sony in the Betamax case. Ashcroft was also the Senate sponsor of an al
ternative bill to the DMCA.
57. Sony Corp. of Am v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that
movie studios were not entitled to control sale of videotape recorders because machines had
substantial noninfringing uses).
58. Lewis Galoob Toys, inc. v. Nintendo of Arn., 964 F.2.d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that it was not contributory infringement to sell Game Genie program so users could change
the play of Nintendo games).
59. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. B orland Int'!, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally di
vided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (holding that the command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 was
not protectable by copyright law because .it was a method of operating a computer).
.

·

60. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
1999) (ruling that the Audio Home Recording Act did not require the maker of the MP3
player to install anti-copying technology).
.

61. Computer Assocs. Int'! v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that ele
ments of programs necessary to achieve compatibility are unprotectable by copyright law).

1502

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1488

com63 are examples of the second category. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose64
and Feist v. Rural Telephone65 may be examples of the third. In several
of these cases, the fair use defense proved to be the kind of flexible
balancing rule that Litman endorses for copyright law in the informa
tion age.66
Of course, counter-examples exist as well. The most pernicious de
cision on digital copyright issues - one that Litman has previously
written about but scarcely mentions in this book - is the Ninth
Circuit's decision in MAI v. Peak,67 which held that software copy
rights could be infringed when an unlicensed person turned on a li
censed firm's computer, thereby booting all the software in the system.
This was not only a wrong decision on the merits,68 but its underlying
premise - that temporary copies of copyrighted material in the ran
dom access memory of a computer infringe the reproduction right inadvertently provided copyright industries and the Clinton
Administration with one of the central tenets of the new high protec
tionism: that any access to or use of a copyrighted work in digital form
infringes the reproduction right unless authorized.69 As mentioned

62. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that it is
fair use to make intermediate copies of computer programs for a legitimate purpose, such as
trying to make a compatible program).
63. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that on
line service provider was not contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright infringement
committed by a user prior to receiving notice of infringement).
64. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (stressing importance of
criticism and parody to ongoing creativity which copyright and the First Amendment are
intended to bring about).
65. Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (raising constitutional as
well as statutory objections to claim that white pages listings of telephone directories could
be copyrighted).
66. This includes Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (fair use to parody "Pretty
Woman" song); Sony-Betamax, 464 U.S. 417 (fair use to make time-shifting copies of broad
cast television shows); Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (fair use to decompile a program for
purposes of making a compatible program); Galoob v. Nintendo, 964 F.2d 965 (fair use to
use Game Genie program to alter the play of Nintendo games); RTC v. Netcom, 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (fair use analysis reinforced ruling against contributory liability for online service
provider for user infringement). See also Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use For Computer Pro
grams and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob
and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993) (discussing implications of these decisions for
many uses of digital information).
67. MAI Sys. Co. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). Litman has criti
cized this decision. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 29 (1994).
68. The decision was so clearly incorrect that Congress legislatively overturned it. See
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title III, Sec. 302, 112 Stat. 2887
(1998), now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117(c); Litman, supra note 67; David Nimmer, Brains
and Other Paraphenalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996). But see Gins
burg, supra note 21 (arguing that MAI v. Peak was correctly decided).
69. See White Paper, supra note 22, at 64-65.
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above, the WIPO Copyright Treaty rejected this view.70 Moreover,
U.S. caselaw does not support the view that the reproduction right
provides copyright owners with an exclusive right to control all uses of
copyrighted information.
There are, of course, some repeat-player advantages for copyright
industries in the courts just as there are in the legislature,71 but it is too
soon to give up on judicial rulings as a means for achieving a better
balance in digital copyright law. One advantage of becoming a more
senior scholar in the intellectual property field is seeing the ebb and
flow of decisions on new technology issues. I was once dismayed by
the first round of software copyright decisions that were highly protec
tionist for substantially the same reason, in my view, that courts haye
sometimes construed copyright law very broadly in digital copyright
cases: concern about the impact that decisions limiting the scope of
protection might have for the viability of the affected industry.72 Over
time, the software copyright decisions became more moderate in tone
and substance as courts recognized the negative consequences for
competition, innovation, and the public interest that would flow result
from highly protectionist rules. Perhaps a similar pattern may emerge
in the digital copyright caselaw in the 2000s.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For more than two hundred years, the United States has con
sciously adopted a plethora of information policies aimed at promot
ing the generation of useful information, its widespread dissemination,
and freedoms to use information both privately and publicly. It has
done so through a wide array of mechanisms, including passage of
copyright laws, but also by support for public education and libraries;
support for basic science; governmental collection and publication of
information (e.g., census and weather data, laws and judicial opin70. See supra note 43.
71. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 6, at 901-02; Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. l , 67-69 (2001).
72. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (extending copyright protection to the structure,
sequence and organization of computer programs so that the software industry would be
adequately protected; announcing a very broad test for software copyright infringement).
Numerous cases initially endorsed Whelan's approach to analyzing software copyright in
fringement. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc., v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th
Cir. 1989); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
The turning point in this line of cases was the Second Circuit's decision in Computer Assocs.
Int'! v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting Whelan's broad test for copyright
infringement as well as the same economic argument for broad copyright protection for
software; announcing a narrower test for copyright infringement). The Altai test displaced
the Whelan test in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532
(11th Cir. 1996); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Sega
Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 199_2).
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ions); subsidized mailing rates for newspapers, magazines, and books;
freedom of information laws; and broadcast regulations, to name just a
few. Many of the freedoms Americans hold dear - including freedom
to send and receive information, and to express and publish one's
ideas - depend on a supporting infrastructure of enlightened infor
mation policies.
Copyright has played an important role in this enlightened infor
mation policy. By providing reassurance that authors could benefit
from the commercial value of their works, copyright law successfully
promoted the creation and dissemination of many · works of author
ship, just as the Founders hoped. This is a function for copyright law
that Litman would preserve. But limitations on the scope of rights are
also important in promoting enlightened information policy.73 The
1976 Act, for example, forbids copyright protection for ideas and in
formation in protected works,74 grants rights to control certain public
although not private uses of the works,75 and privileges fair uses and
redistribution of purchased copies (the latter making libraries and
bookstores legal).76
Digital Copyright explains . how and why some of these limiting
doctrines have been eroding and why the public should care. Litman
points out that "[t]he current digital copyright agenda seeks to supply
copyright answers to a whole range of basic policy questions ranging
from who is entitled to access, to what, and on whose terms, to
whether citizens have any private interest whatsoever in personal
data" (p. 28). Litman would address those questions head-on, but
would provide quite different answers than the copyright industries.
She senses that basic freedoms are at stake and wants to assure their
preservation. Unfortunately, the chances of reforming copyright law
and the copyright policy . process seem dim unless the public once
again becomes engaged in copyright issues and takes action to insist
·

·

73. In other writings, Litman has emphasized the importance of copyright limitations in
promoting enlightened information policy. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright and Informa
tion Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1992); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for a work of
authorship extend to any idea, process, procedure, system, method of operation, principle,
concept or discovery, regardless of �ow it is embodied in the work.") The "idea/expression"
distinction predates the Copyright Act of 1976, but the 1976 Act was the first copyright stat
ute to embody this distinction and expressly provide that processes, procedures, systems and
methods of operation were beyond the scope of copyright protection. So although the 1976
Act broadened copyright protection in some respects, see supra note 14 and accompanying
text, it also contained important limitations on copyright protection. See id. § 103 (copyright
in compilation of facts does not extend to preexisting data).
75. Id. § 106(3)-(5); see also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 (fair use); 109 (first sale limitation) (2000). The nonstatutory doc
trine of copyright misuse also limits the power of copyright owners in exercising their rights.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy ofIntellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999).
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on changes. Litman surely hopes that her book will be both a wakeup
call and a call to action.
Litman implicitly aims her argument not just at the slumbering
public (whom she must know will be disinclined to buy or read a book
on digital copyright law, let alone to demand immediate Congressional
action), but also at copyright professionals - and possibly even to
members of Congress and their staffs - who have reason to worry
that the public simply will not abide by stringent copyright rules even
if industry groups are able to persuade Congress to enact and the
courts to enforce them. Wouldn't it be better, she asks, to have a sim
pler, more coherent, and more balanced law that people would actu
ally respect than to have the engorged law of your dreams that no one
but you can understand or is willing to abide by?
Litman might have done more to formulate strategies for reform
ing the copyright policy process, but by writing Digital Copyright, she
has done a great service in translating the arcana of copyright law into
plain English, in masterfully explicating the breakdown of the copy
right policy process, and in re-conceptualizing copyright law for an in
formation age. A new and fairer deal for copyright is achievable and
worth the effort necessary to bring it about. Excessive copyright pro
tection impedes the progress of science, and contravenes the Enlight
enment policy embodied in the Constitution. Digital technology may
have disrupted the old copyright balance, but that doesn't mean that
balance is no longer necessary, as some copyright industry groups
seem to believe. The balance simply needs to be recalibrated. Public
interest limitations on copyright also need to be more clearly ex
pressed. Digital Copyright provides useful guidance on how to achieve
these important goals. We ignore the lessons it teaches at our peril.

